Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress

Throughout the book, Pinker argues that pessimism and declinism are prevalent, unfounded, and have real, negative consequences for society. Pinker claims that pessimism toward a broad range of issues, as well as society itself, has become widespread among the general public and cultural intellectuals across the political spectrum. To prove this pessimism is real, Pinker compares data that charts advances in health, wealth, lifespan, safety, and more, and then compares this data to people’s perceptions of the issues. For example, US crime rates dropped in the late 20th century, but most US citizens at the time thought they increased.

Pinker blames the “availability bias” for this consistent mismatch in reality and perception. His argument that the media plays a major role in shaping perceptions of society challenges people to examine their own relationship with the media and the beliefs they hold about their community and the world. By providing numerous examples of how seemingly informed people can routinely misperceive whether societal issues are improving or worsening, Pinker warns against accepting alarmist headlines as true. In addition, these examples help him underscore his broader argument that the world has made enormous progress on various issues and that the data supports that claim, even if this doesn’t immediately ring true to us.

To skewer this pessimism—and emphasize that it’s unfounded—Pinker explores a psychological phenomenon he calls the “optimism gap,” which refers to people’s perception that they’re thriving while believing that other people are worse off. Pinker refers to this phenomenon several times throughout his work to prove that most people don’t think that their own health or finances are in decline but—because of the media and availability bias—have that impression about other people. For example, most US citizens think their standard of living has improved while others’ has worsened. The optimism gap is thus another factor that encourages people to view society as in decline, from work and wealth to mental health.

The author presents the optimism gap and availability bias—and the cynicism they encourage—as factors that build a declinist mindset. For Pinker, declinist views—or the belief that society is getting worse and not better—are not just factually wrong but also actively harmful to society’s progress. He claims that unfounded cynicism has infected people of all political leanings; his condemnation of both left-wing “cultural pessimists” and right-wing populists shows that anti-Enlightenment thinking isn’t a partisan issue. Pinker even challenges his own community—professors, intellectuals, and journalists—to consider the effect that their declinist arguments have on the psychology of students and others. His repeated criticism of intellectual pessimism will challenge those who think that society is worse off than before. In addition, Pinker argues that pessimism has only encouraged populist politics, which “blatantly repudiate the ideals of the Enlightenment” because the values they espouse are “tribalist rather than cosmopolitan, authoritarian rather than democratic, contemptuous of experts rather than respectful of knowledge, and nostalgic for an idyllic past rather than hopeful for a better future” (29). Pinker notes that Trump’s populist victory was possible partly because of his followers’ cynicism and refers to a study that showed “the most consistent predictor of Trump support was pessimism” (340). This helps Pinker illustrate the connection between cynicism and people’s embrace of tribal, authoritarian politics, which threaten to undo societal progress.